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Oct 31, 2023

Normalizzare gli Stati Uniti

La relazione tra Stati Uniti e Pakistan è spesso descritta negativamente dai legislatori, dai media e dal pubblico in generale di entrambi i paesi, con un focus sul risentimento e sulla disfunzione reciproci. La prima relazione

La relazione tra Stati Uniti e Pakistan è spesso descritta negativamente dai legislatori, dai media e dal pubblico in generale di entrambi i paesi, con un focus sul risentimento e sulla disfunzione reciproci. I primi rapporti furono gravati da aspettative inadeguate riguardo al sostegno nei conflitti con l'India. Le diverse priorità rispetto all’inizio del coinvolgimento degli Stati Uniti in Afghanistan negli anni ’80 hanno ulteriormente messo a dura prova le relazioni. Gli Stati Uniti hanno anche sanzionato il Pakistan e l’India per lo sviluppo di armi nucleari, che hanno avuto un impatto disparato sul Pakistan, causando tensioni continue.

Molti nella comunità politica e giornalistica di Washington hanno opinioni negative sul Pakistan, considerandolo un facilitatore del terrorismo che cerca rendite geopolitiche ma raramente dà risultati. I pakistani spesso si risentono per quello che vedono come l'uso del paese da parte di Washington come “stato in prima linea” sia nella Guerra Fredda che nella Guerra al Terrore, causando decine di migliaia di vite, per poi scartarlo in seguito. Queste rimostranze sono in gran parte liquidate a Washington come autoinflitte. Nonostante il dibattito pubblico negativo, i funzionari in servizio in entrambi i governi generalmente hanno una visione più sfumata, riconoscendo gli interessi ampi e sovrapposti condivisi da Stati Uniti e Pakistan in aree come il cambiamento climatico, il commercio e l’antiterrorismo.

Esiste già una letteratura esaustiva sul terrorismo in Pakistan, sulla sicurezza nucleare e sui potenziali conflitti lungo la linea di controllo con l’India. Questo mandato si concentrerà invece sul rilancio delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Pakistan attraverso una diplomazia innovativa in aree che hanno ricevuto meno attenzione, come il commercio, l’integrazione regionale, le connessioni interpersonali e il cambiamento climatico.

La sua principale raccomandazione è che Washington si astenga dal vedere il Pakistan attraverso la lente ristretta della “Guerra al terrorismo” o della competizione tra grandi potenze. Dovrebbe invece perseguire i propri interessi attraverso relazioni più normalizzate, pur riconoscendo i limiti degli Stati Uniti nell’influenzare gli eventi in Pakistan o nella regione.

Questo brief offre le seguenti raccomandazioni, alcune delle quali sono già in corso:

Diplomazia impegnata: I diplomatici statunitensi si trovano ad affrontare potenziali minacce da parte di attori non statali e violenza di massa. Tuttavia, l’estrema cautela limita la loro capacità di impegnarsi con la società pakistana e ostacola la diplomazia e la comprensione del Paese. Il Dipartimento di Stato dovrebbe espandere gradualmente la mobilità dei diplomatici, soprattutto nel territorio della capitale Islamabad, Lahore e Karachi, dove le preoccupazioni per la sicurezza sono meno critiche rispetto ad altre parti del paese. Ciò richiederà al Servizio di sicurezza diplomatico di trovare modi per bilanciare la propria missione di mitigazione del rischio con la capacità dei diplomatici statunitensi di svolgere il proprio lavoro. Il Dipartimento della Difesa dovrebbe garantire che gli ufficiali militari statunitensi che completano il corso della National Defense University di Islamabad prestino effettivamente servizio nell'ufficio dell'addetto alla difesa e lavorino per stabilire turni di servizio accompagnati di 24 mesi, simili alle loro controparti europee.

Sostenere l’integrazione regionale: Offrire alternative ai modelli di sicurezza e sviluppo cinesi, ma non trattare il Pakistan come un’arena per una grande competizione di potere. Incoraggiare a livello generale e privato, ma senza mediare o interferire, nel dialogo bilaterale tra India e Pakistan. Utilizzare il Pakistan come via per impegnarsi nuovamente sulla questione afghana ed evitare di isolare l’Afghanistan in un modo che aumenterà l’instabilità regionale con conseguenze sulla sicurezza per i paesi vicini. Adottare un approccio multilaterale e pragmatico nei confronti dei talebani afghani, che richiederà al Pakistan di sfruttare le sue relazioni di lunga data con i membri dei talebani, in particolare con la rete Haqqani.

Rinnovare gli aiuti e dare priorità al commercio: Condurre una valutazione approfondita dell’USAID in Pakistan, inclusa una rivalutazione dei partner e dei progetti locali, per riconfigurare il programma con risultati misurabili per migliorare la vita dei pakistani. Esaminare il modo in cui vengono comunicati i risultati per garantire la comprensione tra la popolazione pakistana. Prendi in considerazione l’idea di investire in iniziative come le biblioteche dello United States Information Service (USIS), che un tempo fungevano da simboli visibili della buona volontà americana nelle principali città pakistane. Aumentare gli incontri del TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework) tra Stati Uniti e Pakistan facilitando un maggiore coinvolgimento del settore privato focalizzato sull’aumento dell’ingresso delle aziende statunitensi nel mercato dei consumi pakistano, utilizzando i lavoratori qualificati del Pakistan e investendo in start-up.

On June 7, 2023, the Inter–Services Public Relations, the media wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, stated, “it is time that noose of law is also tightened around the planners and masterminds” who allegedly planned the events of May 9.https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail?id=6553" rel="footnote">2 Imran Khan’s political future is highly uncertain, and his participation in the upcoming elections as the PTI leader cannot happen since he is now imprisoned under a three–year sentence.Dawn, August 5, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1768528" rel="footnote"3 Proceedings are ongoing and it is possible that Khan’s sentence may be suspended, but PTI’s political influence has waned, despite its popularity, and the security establishment has reasserted itself as the most important pillar of power in the country. The effective dismantling of one of Pakistan’s most popular political parties is concerning for democracy in the country. Nonetheless, Pakistan maintains a lively media, civil society, and vibrant political debates./p>

​​From 2008 to 2014, at least 11,583https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan" rel="footnote">5 Pakistanis were killed in terrorism incidents, including in major cities, while entire districts like Swat fell under insurgent control.Parallels, NPR, June 2, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/06/02/601521263/once-ruled-by-taliban-residents-of-pakistans-swat-valley-say-army-should-leave" rel="footnote">6 This era of violence affected all strata of society; events involving the United States, such as the killing of Osama bin Laden, accidental killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers,Washington Post, November 27, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistani-officials-say-alleged-nato-attack-kills-at-least-12/2011/11/26/gIQA2mqtxN_story.html." rel="footnote">7 and a CIA contractor who shot and killed two Pakistani citizensThe New York Times Magazine, April 9, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-pakistan.html" rel="footnote"8 sparked outrage and a sense of violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, in the eyes of many U.S. technocrats, military leaders, and diplomats, Pakistan bears primary responsibility for its troubles. They point to Pakistan’s support for groups like the Haqqani Network, which killed U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and now enables Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) to target Pakistan. Moreover, the fact that Osama bin Laden found refuge near Abbottabad in Pakistan continues to evoke lasting resentment./p>

Resentment towards U.S. interference in the region is often perceived through the lens of colonialism’s legacy, although the United States was not a colonial power in South Asia. Pakistani leaders sometimes benefit from using anti–American sentiment for political gain.https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/on-pakistani-anti-americanism/" rel="footnote"9 This tactic can rally support, redirect discontent, or be used to attack other powerful stakeholders. Imran Khan, the former prime minister, made U.S. regime change allegations a campaign slogan, and some view it as a euphemism for military interference.10 Military dictators, dynastic politicians, and Islamists have all tried to portray themselves as moderates who can control anti–Americanism in Pakistani society to gain favor in Washington. While Pakistan’s military is criticized by some in the United States, many still see it as a necessary stopgap against violent extremism and anti–Americanism.11/p>

Some degree of antagonism toward Washington will be a feature of any democratic Pakistan.The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 497 (May 1988): 35–45, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1045758?searchText=anti-americanism&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Danti-americanism%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6294%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3A549df485bc85c82dd0507d6f1ecfdb4f&seq=1 " rel="footnote">12 On July 24, 2023, during a press briefing, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller once again denied Washington’s involvement in removing Imran Khan from office, stating, “I feel like I need to bring just a sign that I can hold up in response to this question to say that that allegation is not true.”https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-24-2023/" rel="footnote">13 In early August, The Intercept published what they claimed was a diplomatic cable written by Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, Asad Majeed Khan, documenting a conversation with Donald Lu, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.The Intercept, August 9, 2023, https://theintercept.com/2023/08/09/imran-khan-pakistan-cypher-ukraine-russia/" rel="footnote"14 The contents of the alleged cipher suggest that Lu communicated that U.S.-Pakistan relations would improve if then–prime minister Imran Khan were removed by a no–confidence vote. Lu’s alleged assessment may very well have been fair, and signals from Washington are taken seriously by Pakistan’s military establishment, which seeks to balance its relationship with and dependence on both the U.S. and China. However, as mentioned earlier in this brief, Washington is unable to coerce Pakistan’s military establishment, let alone its lawmakers, into taking an action they do not wish to pursue. The primary driver of Khan’s removal was likely his challenge to the security establishment and opportunism of his political opposition. Differences aside, Pakistan’s security establishment and mainstream political parties, including PTI, all desire positive relations with the United States. However, Washington’s hyphenation of Pakistan with other countries and Islamabad’s comparatively lofty expectations have led to a volatile relationship. Both countries would benefit from having more realistic expectations of the other. The primary driver of Khan’s removal was likely his challenge to the security establishment and opportunism of his political opposition./p>

For two decades, the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan held the U.S.–Pakistan relationship hostage to a failing counterinsurgency and fledgling Afghan state. Accusations of Pakistani double–dealing or American neglect shed little light on this period. The disconnect was rooted in conflicting assumptions about what was best for the region and how committed Washington was to its project in Afghanistan. Despite a reported doubling of terrorist incidents in Pakistan, from 319 in 2020 to 630 in 2022,https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/incidents-data/pakistan" rel="footnote"15 neither the United States nor Pakistan seems to prioritize the issue. There is a logic to this: looming economic and political crises threaten greater instability than suicide blasts. /p>

Washington and Islamabad also share a convergence of interests in Afghanistan beyond counterterrorism but have limited leverage to achieve them. Both want a more inclusive government that respects Afghan rights and prevents Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven. But countries that border Afghanistan have no choice other than to engage pragmatically with the Taliban. The United States should not underestimate the impact of an isolated Afghanistan on its neighbors and adopt a multilateral, pragmatic approach to dealing with the Taliban.Foreign Policy, March 23, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/23/taliban-afghanistan-diplomatic-strategy-united-states/" rel="footnote"16/p>

Achieving positive policy advancements in Afghanistan will require direct and regular U.S. dialogue with the Taliban inside Afghanistan, fostering rapport, personal relationships, and trust, instead of relying on intermediaries or exclusively engaging with cabinet figures in Doha.https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/23/taliban-afghanistan-diplomatic-strategy-united-states/" rel="footnote">17 The U.S.–Taliban agreement initiated an unprecedented dialogue between top Taliban leaders and U.S. officials, despite its limitations. However, this initial goodwill is diminishing rapidly. A study on diplomacy with the Taliban conducted by the United States Institute of Peace warned that “the loss of trust in formal dialogue is not only shared by international representatives but also by decision–makers within the Taliban.”https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan-Peace-Process_The-Talibans-Crisis-of-Diplomacy.pdf, p. 2" rel="footnote"18/p>

U.S.–Pakistan relations and discussions of those relations have been disproportionately focused on traditional security aspects, particularly terrorism. The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) released in October 2022 did not mention Pakistan even once, which caused concern in some quarters of Pakistan’s civil society and government. In comparison, the Obama administration’s NSS released in May 2010 mentioned Pakistan 12 times in the body of the text.https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf" rel="footnote"19 However, this provides an opportunity for relations to move beyond the narrow security realm, which will be explained in detail below and form the basis for the recommendations in this brief. /p>

After the partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan’s economy made strides by shifting to value–added products, leading to significant export growth. However, this progress relied on import substitution, resulting in overreliance on cotton–based products and textiles, production of non–competitive products, and chronic balance of payments problems.Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State (Oxford University Press, 1999) 280–81, 290." rel="footnote"21 This policy also led to an elite bargain where unproductive sectors receive substantial government subsidies, foreign investment is low, and small businesses struggle to access financing. /p>

In current times, Pakistan heavily relies on foreign aid, loans, and remittances as it spends more than it earns. In fiscal year 2022, the general government deficit was 7.9 percent of GDP, and public debt reached 78 percent of GDP. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041223153536828/P17507702d44490bd0bb660b4b60037e930PER, 1. This is the first PER report since 2010." rel="footnote">22 In July 2022, over seventy percent of all bank credit in Pakistan was extended to the public sector, which leads to a high interdependence between the government and the financial sector. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041223153536828/P17507702d44490bd0bb660b4b60037e930PER, 3-4." rel="footnote"23 This presents the risk of significant financial losses for the financial sector if the government fails to service its debts, potentially destabilizing the entire financial system.24 The private sector also faces challenges in obtaining sufficient credit due to the dominance of public sector borrowing. /p>

Pakistan also faces challenges with tax collection and circular debt. Provinces receive the majority of the country’s revenue, while the federal government struggles to cover its expenses. In fiscal year 2022, the federal government used 46 percent of total tax revenue to cover 67 percent of the country’s expenditures. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041223153536828/P17507702d44490bd0bb660b4b60037e930PER, 5." rel="footnote">25 Pakistan’s tax collection is below the regional average, with numerous exceptions for certain industries, salaried employees, and income brackets. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041223153536828/P17507702d44490bd0bb660b4b60037e930PER, 12–13." rel="footnote">26 As of 2018, only 1.5 million taxpayers were registered — i.e., less than one percent of the population.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0282d8a4-ba2e-55fe-8c34-ff028c61fd6f/content, 6." rel="footnote">27 Regressive subsidies further exacerbate income inequality. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041223153536828/P17507702d44490bd0bb660b4b60037e930PER, 7." rel="footnote">28 Economic growth is also hindered by energy shortages, with almost 40 percent of Pakistan’s total primary energy supply imported.https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/850111/carec-energy-outlook-2030.pdf" rel="footnote"29 Circular debt in the energy sector is a recurring problem, with power generation companies, distribution companies, and the government owing each other money, leading to a net buildup of debt and prolonged power outages.30/p>

Approximately 32 percent of Pakistan’s population is between 10–24 years old.https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/PK" rel="footnote"31 The country’s economy isn’t growing quickly enough to absorb new job seekers, even though women — including those with higher education — are underutilized in the workforce. The elite and upper middle class use their social status to secure positions and live luxuriously regardless of their profession. Otherwise, upward mobility is rare, regardless of qualifications. The military and civil service offer some mobility, but they too are plagued by elite culture and opportunities in well–paid manufacturing jobs and trades are limited. If not for visa restrictions and family obligations, there would be an even greater brain drain. In contrast, India and Bangladesh offer greater upward mobility despite inequality. /p>

The recently approved IMF package has saved Pakistan from defaulting on its financial obligations in the short term and was approved largely due to external financing pledges by Pakistan’s friends.https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/07/12/pr23261-pakistan-imf-exec-board-approves-us3bil-sba#:~:text=Washington%2C%20DC%3A%20Today%2C%20the,the%20authorities’%20economic%20stabilization%20program." rel="footnote"32 It will alleviate the immediate crisis, but it will buy months, not years. The solution to Pakistan’s economic dysfunction lies in the hands of the country’s political, economic, and military elites, who must undo the elite bargain that exists among them. This will require properly taxing individuals and industries, reducing protectionist policies, and vigorously pursuing foreign investment. The Pakistani state must dismantle the regulatory barriers that hinder both domestic and foreign investment.33/p>

The United States is Pakistan’s single largest destination for exports, accounting for 21.1 percent of total exports, with China in second place at 10.5 percent according to World Bank data.https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/PAK; “Pakistan”, Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed August, 2023, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/pakistan; Pakistan was the United States’ 57th largest goods export market prior to the pandemic in 2019, and 56th largest good trading partner if two-way trade is considered." rel="footnote"34 Many Pakistani products don’t reach American consumers because Pakistani firms fail to navigate U.S. regulations. For example, producers of Pakistan’s world–renowned mangoes have struggled to reach U.S. consumers largely due to the absence of an approved irradiation center in Pakistan.35/p>

The United States and Pakistan should continue to meet under the U.S.–Pakistan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which was signed by both countries in 2003.https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file849_9759.pdf" rel="footnote"36 Merely talking is insufficient, and efforts should be bolstered by facilitating U.S. private sector delegations that can uncover fresh avenues for American companies to tap into Pakistan’s expanding consumer market and leverage Pakistan’s nascent but growing skilled tech workforce, explore startup investments, and solidify business agreements. The private sector must take the lead in this endeavor, but the U.S. Embassy’s encouragement can be instrumental. However, the primary obstacles for enhancing economic ties lie within Pakistan, requiring the proactive engagement of its government to modernize industries and remove barriers to foreign investment./p>

The United States has a significant economic presence in Pakistan that extends beyond trade. During the last two decades, the United States has given over $32 billion in direct support to the people of Pakistan through different agencies.https://pk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/us-assistance-to-pakistan/" rel="footnote">37 Much of this is overseen by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. agency primarily responsible for administering development assistance around the world. USAID has failed to generate the same level of goodwill as Chinese investment, even when Beijing’s investment is perceived as predatory (as in the Gwadar Port). Additionally, the effectiveness of USAID falls behind that of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID).https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThaMPQfGmSU" rel="footnote"38/p>

USAID’s operations in Pakistan require a significant reevaluation that is beyond the scope of this brief. USAID should reconsider its self–imposed limitations on the mobility of its personnel, reluctance to participate in large–scale infrastructure projects, and its focus on initiatives intended to foster democracy or tolerance, even when such programs are clearly ineffective.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThaMPQfGmSU. Nadim Hussain served as Executive Director of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute from 2020–22. The Institute is an Islamabad–based think tank affiliated with the National Security Division of the Government of Pakistan, which falls under the Office of the Prime Minister." rel="footnote"39 USAID has also created an atmosphere where NGOs function more like consulting firms competing for contracts than as local entities seizing an opportunity. This incentivizes partners on the ground to prioritize solutions appealing to U.S. technocrats, rather than those effective in Pakistani society. /p>

USAID’s capacity in Pakistan is constrained by its limited budget, which falls short of what is required, and its understanding of the country.https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/pakistanseducationcrisistherealstory2.pdf " rel="footnote">40 Given these limitations, USAID should prioritize projects in healthcare, sanitation, climate resilience, and some infrastructure, while avoiding initiatives that implicate cultural sensitivities. Social change should be organic. Washington’s utilization of the public health sector for covert security purposes continues to haunt current vaccination programs and should never be repeated.All Things Considered, NPR, September 6, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/06/1034631928/the-cias-hunt-for-bin-laden-has-had-lasting-repercussions-for-ngos-in-pakistan#:~:text=But%20the%20bin%20Laden%20raid,and%20health%20workers%20were%20targeted." rel="footnote"41 Despite initiatives improving the lives of ordinary Pakistanis through vaccines, scholarships, sanitation, and technology, the United States struggles to communicate these efforts effectively, partly due to self–imposed restrictions on diplomats./p>

Pakistan produces just 0.9 percent of global carbon emissions despite being the fifth most populous country, yet is regularly featured among the top 10 countries most vulnerable to climate change.https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/Pakistan%20Updated%20NDC%202021.pdf" rel="footnote">42 Following the floods in Pakistan in August 2022, the Pakistani government used this disparity to persuade donor countries to pledge money for climate resilience and damages. A conference held in Geneva on January 9, 2023, co–hosted by the United Nations and the Government of Pakistan, resulted in over $9 billion pledged from donor countries for flood damages.https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-chief-calls-massive-investments-pakistan-recovery-2023-01-09/" rel="footnote">43 However, it’s uncertain that all the funds will be delivered. The United States has responded by committing over $200 million in flood relief,https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jan-09-2023-united-states-pledges-100-million-support-continued-flood-recovery-efforts-pakistan" rel="footnote">44 disaster resilience, food security assistance, and 500 new scholarships to Pakistani students affected by the floods.https://pk.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-announces-scholarships-for-flood-affected-students-in-pakistan/#:~:text=U.S.%20Government%20Announces%20Scholarships%20for%20Flood%2DAffected%20Students%20in%20Pakistan,-Home%20%7C%20News%20%26%20Events&text=Islamabad%2C%20March%207%2C%202023%3A,them%20in%20completing%20their%20degrees." rel="footnote"45 The Pakistani–American diaspora also proved pivotal in liaising between governments, NGOs, and aid organizations./p>

There are significant people–to–people exchanges between the United States and Pakistan. In 2019, there were approximately 554,000 individuals of Pakistani descent living in the United States compared to 204,000 in 2000.https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/fact-sheet/asian-americans-pakistanis-in-the-u-s/" rel="footnote">46 The diaspora is concentrated in New York, Houston, Washington, and Chicago. Fulbright scholarships were awarded to 189 Pakistanis to begin studies and research at 82 U.S. universities beginning in fall 2022.https://pk.usembassy.gov/189-pakistanis-receive-fulbright-scholarships-for-masters-and-phd-degrees-in-the-united-states/" rel="footnote">47 This continues a trend since 2005 of Pakistan producing the largest contingent of Fulbright scholars.https://usefp.org/scholarships/fulbright-degree-FAQ.cfm" rel="footnote"48 /p>

But this academic and cultural exchange is not a two–way street. Pakistan is not offered as a Fulbright destination for U.S. students, nor are tourism or business exchanges to Pakistan common. The State Department’s Critical Languages Scholarship program sends students to Lucknow, India to study Urdu even though it is the national language of Pakistan, not India. https://clscholarship.org/languages/urdu" rel="footnote">49 Once in Pakistan, U.S. diplomats have few opportunities to travel or meet ordinary Pakistanis.50 U.S. diplomats and defense attachés also conduct shorter tours compared to their European counterparts, partly because they are often unaccompanied by family.https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/28/2003104852/-1/-1/1/TOUR_LENGTHS_AND_TOURS_OF_DUTY_OCONUS.PDF" rel="footnote">51 This hinders U.S. diplomacy, aid, and engagement with Pakistani society.52 Difficulty in obtaining visas, particularly in a timely fashion, remains a hindrance for exchanges running both ways.https://pk.usembassy.gov/expansion-of-interview-waiver-eligibility-for-u-s-visa-holders-from-pakistan-2/, “Global Visa Wait Times,” U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs, last updated August 25, 2023, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/global-visa-wait-times.html" rel="footnote"53/p>

China and the United States form Pakistan’s two most important relationships. It is their shared territorial disputes with India and perceived interest in countering India’s rise that have solidified what Bilawal Bhutto, until recently Pakistan’s foreign minister, recently referred to as an “all–weather strategic cooperative partnership”​​ between China and Pakistan.https://twitter.com/BBhuttoZardari/status/1683834393075372032?s=20" rel="footnote"54 However, Pakistan’s establishment prefers to keep a balance between the two countries and lopsidedness in relations, particularly military–to–military ties, are discomfiting. U.S.–China competition only adds to this discomfort as Pakistan’s leaders worry that they will be forced to choose between the two relationships.55 Moreover, as previously explained, Pakistan is on the sidelines of the U.S. Indopacific strategy, which prioritizes India to contain, or at least balance, China./p>

According to a recent analysis, China is now the top supplier of Pakistan’s conventional weapons and provides 80 percent of its combat airpower, such as JF–17 and F–7 fighter jets.https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/threshold-alliance-china-pakistan-military-relationship" rel="footnote">56 It may also provide Z–10ME attack helicopters to replace older Cobras.https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/threshold-alliance-china-pakistan-military-relationship" rel="footnote">57 However, Pakistan still values its F–16 fleet, and its purchase of Chinese–made weapons is often due to availability rather than preference. The development of Gwadar Port, a deep–sea port along Pakistan’s Makran coast, by China was initiated at the request of Pervez Musharraf, rather than being a machination of Beijing. The port could be a military asset where Chinese naval vessels may stop for refueling and docking, but for now it’s not certain whether there are any plans to create a fully functioning Chinese naval base there.https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/threshold-alliance-china-pakistan-military-relationship" rel="footnote"58/p>

During his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 14, 2023, Geoffrey Pyatt, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, blamed China for Pakistan’s heavy dependence on coal–fired power generation, claiming, “I saw first–hand during my visit to Pakistan in March that the PRC has been the driving factor in Pakistan’s ongoing reliance on coal–fired power generation.”https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20230614/116025/HHRG-118-FA00-Wstate-PyattG-20230614.pdf " rel="footnote">61 Pyatt further pointed out that since 2015, CPEC has invested around $7.2 billion in developing 4,950 megawatts of coal–fired power plants for the national grid, with a substantial portion of the coal imported, exacerbating Pakistan’s financial challenges.https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/gjs_665170/gjsxw_665172/202109/t20210923_9580159.html" rel="footnote">62 The United States is right to caution countries about the risks of Chinese loans and investment, but as long as the United States remains uninvolved in large–scale infrastructure projects, China will be the main player in the region. As mentioned earlier, Washington must scale up its green initiatives https://pk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-u-s-pakistan-climate-and-environment-working-group/#:~:text=Through%20the%20Climate%20and%20Environment,and%20effectiveness%20for%20Pakistani%20farmers; “Fact Sheet: Results from U.S.–Pakistan Climate and Environment Working Group,” U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, March 16, 2023, https://pk.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-results-from-u-s-pakistan-climate-and-environment-working-group-march-16-2023/; Ambassador Donald Blome’s visit to Thatta District “wind corridor” reaffirmed commitment to technical cooperation. “US to expand energy cooperation with Pakistan: Blome,” GeoNews, May 26, 2023, https://www.geo.tv/latest/489502-us-to-expand-clean-energy-cooperation-with-pakistan-blome" rel="footnote"63 if it wants to provide a genuine alternative. /p>

Pakistan, with a youthful population of just over 240 million and growing, faces many challenges. Its security forces suffer casualties similar to those sustained by the U.S. military during the Afghanistan surge.https://twitter.com/IhsanTipu/status/1514551716473098243?s=20&t=YFC6OHBhBcmKs8UxxoBuiA" rel="footnote"64 Despite not posing an existential threat to the state, these groups still inflict damage by eroding state confidence, straining cohesion, and discouraging investment. While the possibility of a large–scale war with India is real, past escalations were resolved within a few weeks. The two biggest threats to Pakistan are clearly economic collapse and the disastrous effects of climate change. /p>

A positive trajectory for Pakistan will benefit the region and world, but instability will produce worsening consequences. Washington seems more eager than Islamabad to move beyond the security–focused relations of the past and collaborate in areas like trade and climate resilience. The Pakistani government appears deeply committed to crisis diplomacy, despite its desire for a “geoeconomic reset.” As Stephen P. Cohen famously observed in 2004, “Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head.”The Idea of Pakistan, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 270." rel="footnote"65 Such tactics will fail in a world increasingly distracted with geopolitical issues in other regions./p>

Washington should reconsider how it engages with Pakistan and, more importantly, Pakistanis. Despite investing hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, distributing almost 80 million vaccines for COVID–19, offering Fulbright awards to over 4,000 Pakistanis since 1951 https://pk.usembassy.gov/189-pakistanis-receive-fulbright-scholarships-for-masters-and-phd-degrees-in-the-united-states/" rel="footnote">66 and building a network of over 25,000 Pakistanis who have participated in U.S. government sponsored exchange programs,https://fulbrightalumni.usefp.org/puan." rel="footnote"67 and having close ties between political and military elites, many Pakistanis still hold negative views of the United States. This raises concerns about the effectiveness of Washington’s engagement with Pakistani society. The recommendations included in this paper, some of which are already being implemented by the U.S. Embassy, offer a starting point for improving relations and rightsizing expectations. /p>